An ongoing research project with

Atlantic Council DFRLab

Coordinated disinformation campaigns are more likely to thrive when they go unnoticed and unchecked. This interactive visualizer breaks down the methods, targets, and origins of select coordinated disinformation campaigns throughout the world.

This project visualizes coordinated disinformation campaigns identified by the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab. Alphabet does not endorse these research findings or their characterization of disinformation campaigns.

An ongoing research project with

Atlantic Council DFRLab

About

This project visualizes the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab research on coordinated disinformation campaigns.

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About this project

This project visualizes the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab research on coordinated disinformation campaigns. The campaigns included reflect DFRLab's own analysis and perspective, using their own tools and datasets or those obtained from their partners. Google does not endorse these research findings or their characterization of disinformation campaigns. Google combats coordinated disinformation campaigns across its products and its enforcement actions are driven by its own independent investigations, which include consideration of intelligence and data that is not available to external researchers. The Visualizer is intended to help newcomers better understand disinformation campaigns. DFRLab’s research predominantly relies on open source, English language press reporting of coordinated disinformation campaigns that may appear to target the West.

#TrollTracker: Russian Traces in Facebook Takedown

  • Date first seen
    2017
  • Target
    United States
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Non-State Political Actor, Minority/Majority Group
  • Platforms
    Social Media

UAE Facebook Pages Targeted Qatar and Muslim Brotherhood.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Non-State Political Actor, Terrorism
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

From Telegram to Twitter: Top Puerto Rican Officials Plotted Possible Information Operation.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Puerto Rico
  • Methods
    Brigading, Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#TrollTracker: Facebook Uncovers Iranian Influence Operation.

  • Date first seen
  • Target
    United States
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military, Political Party, Non-State Political Actor, Minority/Majority Group, Terrorism
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#PutinAtWar: WADA Hack Shows Kremlin Full-Spectrum Approach.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    United States
  • Methods
    DDoS, Data Exfiltration
  • Topics
    Non-State Political Actor, Influential Individual, Immigration, Economic Issues
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Facebook Takes Down Network Supporting Indonesian Presidential Candidate Prabowo Subianto.

  • Date first seen
  • Target
    Indonesia
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Elections, Minority/Majority Group
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Civilian Militias in Venezuela Coordinate on Twitter.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Venezuela
  • Methods
    Brigading, Botnets
  • Topics
    Military
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Inauthentic Pages Linked to Majority Government Taken down in Georgia.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Georgia
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Armenia Assailed by Deceptive “Fact-Checking” Groups, Part 1: The Players.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Armenia
  • Methods
    Brigading
  • Topics
    Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Italy’s Self-Made Bots.

  • Date first seen
    2014
  • Target
    Italy
  • Methods
    Brigading, Botnets, Other
  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Russia’s Full Spectrum Propaganda.

  • Date first seen
    2017
  • Target
    United States
  • Methods
    Brigading, Sockpuppets, Botnets
  • Topics
    Influential Individual
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Likes from Afar in Oaxaca.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Mexico
  • Methods
    Other
  • Topics
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Facebook’s Sputnik Takedown — In Depth.

  • Date first seen
    2010
  • Target
    Baltic States
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#TrollTracker: Facebook’s Midterm Takedown.

  • Date first seen
  • Target
    United States
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military, Influential Individual, Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#ElectionWatch: FGV DAPP Uncovers Foreign Twitter Influence in Brazil.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Brazil
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets, Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#TrollTracker: Glimpse Into a French Operation.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    France
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#BalticBrief: NATO Not Planning To Invade Belarus.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Lithuania
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets, Data Exfiltration
  • Topics
    Military, Non-State Political Actor
  • Platforms
    Open Web

Social Media Spam Tactics in Indonesia.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Indonesia
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Inauthentic Israeli Facebook Assets Target the World.

  • Date first seen
    2017
  • Target
    West Africa
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections, Other
  • Platforms
    Social Media

How a “Political Astroturfing” App Coordinates Pro-Israel Influence Operations.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
  • Methods
    Brigading
  • Topics
    Military, Non-State Political Actor, Terrorism
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#BalticBrief: Disinformation Through Mistranslation.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Lithuania
  • Methods
    Other Deceptive Content Manipulation
  • Topics
    Military
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Inauthentic Sputnik-Linked Pages Target the Armenian Diaspora.

  • Date first seen
  • Target
    Armenia
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military, Influential Individual, Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Facebook Disabled Assets Linked to Egypt and UAE-Based Firms.

  • Date first seen
    2015
  • Target
    Middle East
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military, Elections, Terrorism, Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#TrollTracker: Iran’s Suspected Information Operation.

  • Date first seen
  • Target
    United States
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military, Political Party, Non-State Political Actor, Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Twitter's Hong Kong Archives: Chinese Commercial Bots at Work.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Hong Kong
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Influential Individual, Other
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#BotSpot: Bots Join Backlash Against Islamophobic Cartoon Contest.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Netherlands
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Royally Removed: Facebook Takes Down Pages Promoting Saudi Interests.

  • Date first seen
    2017
  • Target
    Turkey
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media, Advertisment

Catalonia Twitter Takedown: Inorganic Campaign Pushed Pro-Independence Content.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Spain
  • Methods
    Brigading, Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Non-State Political Actor, Influential Individual
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Gavrilov’s Night': Multiple Facebook Pages Target Protests in Georgia.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Georgia
  • Methods
    Brigading
  • Topics
    Political Party, Influential Individual, Minority/Majority Group
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Bot-Like Accounts and Pro-Government Hashtags in Colombia.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Colombia
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Military, Influential Individual
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Facebook Takes Down Inauthentic Pages with Connections to Thailand.

  • Date first seen
    2010
  • Target
    Thailand
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military, Economic Issues
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Facebook Takes Down the 'Voice of Truth' in Ukraine.

  • Date first seen
    2012
  • Target
    Ukraine
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Minority/Majority Group
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Facebook Removes Iran-based Assets. Again.

  • Date first seen
    2015
  • Target
    United States
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections, Non-State Political Actor
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Libyan Hashtag Campaign Has Broader Designs: Trolling Qatar.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Libya
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Military, Political Party, Terrorism
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Italy’s Far Right Attacks Right in Closing Moments.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Italy
  • Methods
    Brigading, Botnets, Other Deceptive Content Manipulation
  • Topics
    Political Party, Non-State Political Actor
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#BalticBrief: False Story About Collapsed Mall Doesn’t Hold Up.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Latvia
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Facebook Takes down Pro-Indonesian Pages Targeting West Papua.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Indonesia
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Minority/Majority Group, Terrorism, Economic Issues
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Post-Electoral Bots in Puebla.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Mexico
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Facebook Removes Assets Connected to Egyptian Newspaper El Fagr.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Egypt
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Inauthentic Activity Tested Ahead Naming Referendum.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    North Macedonia
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Minority/Majority Group
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Coordinated Comments in Macedonia

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Macedonia
  • Methods
    Brigading
  • Topics
    Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Facebook and Twitter Remove Accounts Connected to Spanish Political Party.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Spain
  • Methods
    Brigading, Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Platforms
    Social Media, Messaging Platforms

Secondary Infektion Redux? Suspected Russian Intelligence Operation Targets Greenland.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Greenland
  • Methods
    Other Deceptive Content Manipulation
  • Topics
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Sockpuppet Accounts Impersonate India’s Space Agency Chief.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    India
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Other
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Facebook Takes down Iranian Assets, Some Targeting Latin American Audiences.

  • Date first seen
    2016
  • Target
    Latin America
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military, Non-State Political Actor, Terrorism, Economic Issues
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Protests Reinterpreted Online in Brazil.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Brazil
  • Methods
    Brigading, Data Exfiltration, Other Deceptive Content Manipulation
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#TrollTracker: Venezuelan Government-linked Influence Campaign on Twitter.

  • Date first seen
    2014
  • Target
    Venezuela
  • Methods
    Brigading, Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

IN DEPTH: Iranian Propaganda Network Goes Down.

  • Date first seen
    2016
  • Target
    Indonesia
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Influential Individual, Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Bots on Both Sides in India.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    India
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Facebook Dismantled Iranian Influence Operation.

  • Date first seen
    2015
  • Target
    West and Central Africa
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military, Political Party, Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Insta-Deception Targets Ukraine.

  • Date first seen
  • Target
    Ukraine
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military, Political Party, Elections
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#TrollTracker: Spam Attack on Secretary Pompeo.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    United States
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Other
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#TrollTracker: Facebook Takes Down Fake Network in Romania.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Romania
  • Methods
    Brigading
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#TrollTracker: Facebook Takes Down Fake Network in the United Kingdom.

  • Date first seen
  • Target
    United Kingdom
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Influential Individual, Minority/Majority Group, Terrorism
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#TrollTracker: Outward Influence Operation From Iran.

  • Date first seen
    2010
  • Target
    Middle East
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets, Other Deceptive Content Manipulation
  • Topics
    Military, Non-State Political Actor, Influential Individual, Minority/Majority Group, Terrorism, Immigration, Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#InfluenceForSale: Venezuela’s Twitter Propaganda Mill.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Venezuela
  • Methods
    Brigading
  • Topics
    Political Party, Economic Issues
  • Platforms
    Social Media, Messaging Platforms

Bot Battlefield at #AMLOFest.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Mexico
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections, Immigration
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#BalticBrief: False Claim of Plans for Ethnic Cleansing in Latvia.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Latvia
  • Methods
  • Topics
    Military, Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#BotSpot: Bots Target Malaysian Elections.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Malaysia
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Bot-like Turkish Accounts Complement Military Operation in Syria.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Military, Non-State Political Actor, Minority/Majority Group, Terrorism, Immigration
  • Platforms
    Social Media

5

10

15

20

25

Number of events

Facebook’s Sputnik Takedown — In Depth.

  • Date first seen
    2010
  • Target
    Baltic States
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Facebook Takes Down Inauthentic Pages with Connections to Thailand.

  • Date first seen
    2010
  • Target
    Thailand
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military, Economic Issues
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#TrollTracker: Outward Influence Operation From Iran.

  • Date first seen
    2010
  • Target
    Middle East
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets, Other Deceptive Content Manipulation
  • Topics
    Military, Non-State Political Actor, Influential Individual, Minority/Majority Group, Terrorism, Immigration, Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Facebook Takes Down the 'Voice of Truth' in Ukraine.

  • Date first seen
    2012
  • Target
    Ukraine
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Minority/Majority Group
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Italy’s Self-Made Bots.

  • Date first seen
    2014
  • Target
    Italy
  • Methods
    Brigading, Botnets, Other
  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#TrollTracker: Venezuelan Government-linked Influence Campaign on Twitter.

  • Date first seen
    2014
  • Target
    Venezuela
  • Methods
    Brigading, Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Facebook Disabled Assets Linked to Egypt and UAE-Based Firms.

  • Date first seen
    2015
  • Target
    Middle East
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military, Elections, Terrorism, Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Facebook Removes Iran-based Assets. Again.

  • Date first seen
    2015
  • Target
    United States
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections, Non-State Political Actor
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Facebook Dismantled Iranian Influence Operation.

  • Date first seen
    2015
  • Target
    West and Central Africa
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military, Political Party, Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Facebook Takes down Iranian Assets, Some Targeting Latin American Audiences.

  • Date first seen
    2016
  • Target
    Latin America
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military, Non-State Political Actor, Terrorism, Economic Issues
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

IN DEPTH: Iranian Propaganda Network Goes Down.

  • Date first seen
    2016
  • Target
    Indonesia
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Influential Individual, Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#TrollTracker: Russian Traces in Facebook Takedown

  • Date first seen
    2017
  • Target
    United States
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Non-State Political Actor, Minority/Majority Group
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Russia’s Full Spectrum Propaganda.

  • Date first seen
    2017
  • Target
    United States
  • Methods
    Brigading, Sockpuppets, Botnets
  • Topics
    Influential Individual
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Inauthentic Israeli Facebook Assets Target the World.

  • Date first seen
    2017
  • Target
    West Africa
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections, Other
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Royally Removed: Facebook Takes Down Pages Promoting Saudi Interests.

  • Date first seen
    2017
  • Target
    Turkey
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media, Advertisment

UAE Facebook Pages Targeted Qatar and Muslim Brotherhood.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Non-State Political Actor, Terrorism
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

From Telegram to Twitter: Top Puerto Rican Officials Plotted Possible Information Operation.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Puerto Rico
  • Methods
    Brigading, Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#PutinAtWar: WADA Hack Shows Kremlin Full-Spectrum Approach.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    United States
  • Methods
    DDoS, Data Exfiltration
  • Topics
    Non-State Political Actor, Influential Individual, Immigration, Economic Issues
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Inauthentic Pages Linked to Majority Government Taken down in Georgia.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Georgia
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Armenia Assailed by Deceptive “Fact-Checking” Groups, Part 1: The Players.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Armenia
  • Methods
    Brigading
  • Topics
    Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Likes from Afar in Oaxaca.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Mexico
  • Methods
    Other
  • Topics
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#ElectionWatch: FGV DAPP Uncovers Foreign Twitter Influence in Brazil.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Brazil
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets, Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#TrollTracker: Glimpse Into a French Operation.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    France
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#BalticBrief: NATO Not Planning To Invade Belarus.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Lithuania
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets, Data Exfiltration
  • Topics
    Military, Non-State Political Actor
  • Platforms
    Open Web

#BalticBrief: Disinformation Through Mistranslation.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Lithuania
  • Methods
    Other Deceptive Content Manipulation
  • Topics
    Military
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#BotSpot: Bots Join Backlash Against Islamophobic Cartoon Contest.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Netherlands
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Catalonia Twitter Takedown: Inorganic Campaign Pushed Pro-Independence Content.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Spain
  • Methods
    Brigading, Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Non-State Political Actor, Influential Individual
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Italy’s Far Right Attacks Right in Closing Moments.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Italy
  • Methods
    Brigading, Botnets, Other Deceptive Content Manipulation
  • Topics
    Political Party, Non-State Political Actor
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#BalticBrief: False Story About Collapsed Mall Doesn’t Hold Up.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Latvia
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Facebook Takes down Pro-Indonesian Pages Targeting West Papua.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Indonesia
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Minority/Majority Group, Terrorism, Economic Issues
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Post-Electoral Bots in Puebla.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Mexico
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Facebook Removes Assets Connected to Egyptian Newspaper El Fagr.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Egypt
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Military
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Inauthentic Activity Tested Ahead Naming Referendum.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    North Macedonia
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Minority/Majority Group
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Coordinated Comments in Macedonia

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Macedonia
  • Methods
    Brigading
  • Topics
    Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Protests Reinterpreted Online in Brazil.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Brazil
  • Methods
    Brigading, Data Exfiltration, Other Deceptive Content Manipulation
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#TrollTracker: Facebook Takes Down Fake Network in Romania.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Romania
  • Methods
    Brigading
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#InfluenceForSale: Venezuela’s Twitter Propaganda Mill.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Venezuela
  • Methods
    Brigading
  • Topics
    Political Party, Economic Issues
  • Platforms
    Social Media, Messaging Platforms

Bot Battlefield at #AMLOFest.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Mexico
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections, Immigration
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#BalticBrief: False Claim of Plans for Ethnic Cleansing in Latvia.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Latvia
  • Methods
  • Topics
    Military, Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

#BotSpot: Bots Target Malaysian Elections.

  • Date first seen
    2018
  • Target
    Malaysia
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Civilian Militias in Venezuela Coordinate on Twitter.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Venezuela
  • Methods
    Brigading, Botnets
  • Topics
    Military
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Social Media Spam Tactics in Indonesia.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Indonesia
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Platforms
    Social Media

How a “Political Astroturfing” App Coordinates Pro-Israel Influence Operations.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
  • Methods
    Brigading
  • Topics
    Military, Non-State Political Actor, Terrorism
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Twitter's Hong Kong Archives: Chinese Commercial Bots at Work.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Hong Kong
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Influential Individual, Other
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Gavrilov’s Night': Multiple Facebook Pages Target Protests in Georgia.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Georgia
  • Methods
    Brigading
  • Topics
    Political Party, Influential Individual, Minority/Majority Group
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Bot-Like Accounts and Pro-Government Hashtags in Colombia.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Colombia
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Military, Influential Individual
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Libyan Hashtag Campaign Has Broader Designs: Trolling Qatar.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Libya
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Military, Political Party, Terrorism
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Facebook and Twitter Remove Accounts Connected to Spanish Political Party.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Spain
  • Methods
    Brigading, Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Platforms
    Social Media, Messaging Platforms

Secondary Infektion Redux? Suspected Russian Intelligence Operation Targets Greenland.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    Greenland
  • Methods
    Other Deceptive Content Manipulation
  • Topics
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Sockpuppet Accounts Impersonate India’s Space Agency Chief.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    India
  • Methods
    Sockpuppets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Other
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#ElectionWatch: Bots on Both Sides in India.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    India
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections
  • Platforms
    Social Media

#TrollTracker: Spam Attack on Secretary Pompeo.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
    United States
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Other
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Bot-like Turkish Accounts Complement Military Operation in Syria.

  • Date first seen
    2019
  • Target
  • Methods
    Botnets
  • Topics
    Military, Non-State Political Actor, Minority/Majority Group, Terrorism, Immigration
  • Platforms
    Social Media

2010

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2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Year Campaign Started

First seen
Target
Title
Methods
Disinformant Category
Platforms

Methodology

This project visualizes the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) research on coordinated disinformation campaigns. The project makes it possible to search, compare, and visualize a select group of coordinated disinformation campaigns that have been identified and studied by the DFRLab. These campaigns date to as early as 2010; several are still ongoing.

The DFRLab defines disinformation as “false or misleading information, spread with the intention to deceive.” Political disinformation is defined as “disinformation with a political or politically adjacent end.” The DFRLab defines political disinformation campaigns as “political disinformation that demonstrates both coordination and a discrete objective.”

These campaigns typically include political astroturfing, in which a seemingly grassroots movement is orchestrated from behind the scenes. These campaigns also typically include coordinated inauthentic behavior, in which social media accounts work together while disguising their identities or objectives. Selected cases do not include instances of political misinformation, in which evidence of coordination or intent is absent.

The Data Visualizer is intended to describe the targets, platforms, methods, origins, and intent of individual political disinformation campaigns. Its classification system mirrors the approach that DFRLab researchers use in evaluating new cases. This system consists of 74 binary variables, such as the technical methods or narrative techniques employed, and 24 text descriptors, such as concurrent events or the campaign’s inferred objective. The system offers a high degree of granularity and enables comparison of cases across disparate cultural and political contexts.

Each case is based on existing public documentation of a political disinformation campaign. This approach ensures that case selection is consistent and transparent. However, it will also result in a degree of overlap as more cases are added to the database.

The initial database consists of 60 cases. Each case has been independently coded by two researchers, with disagreements tracked and reconciled in a collaborative process. Initial cases are limited to studies previously published by the DFRLab.

Because less reporting is available on cases that target the Global South and because the total number of cases is potentially inexhaustible, the database should not be used to draw definitive judgments about the prevalence of disinformation in some nations over others.

When assessing cases of disinformation, attribution presents a particular challenge. While disinformation is, by definition, deliberate and carried out with intent, proving both the actor and intent occurs with varying degrees of confidence in every case. The database delineates attribution in cases cited, but also attempts to demonstrate the scale of confidence necessary to make objective assessments that differentiate disinformation from misinformation.

The campaigns included reflect DFRLab's own analysis and perspective, using their own tools and datasets or those obtained from their partners. Google does not endorse these research findings or their characterization of disinformation campaigns. Google combats coordinated disinformation campaigns across its products and its enforcement actions are driven by its own independent investigations, which include consideration of intelligence and data that is not available to external researchers. The Visualizer is intended to help newcomers better understand disinformation campaigns. DFRLab’s research predominantly relies on open source, English language press reporting of coordinated disinformation campaigns that may appear to target the West.

You can view the detailed methodology, codebook, and whitepaper on DFRLab’s GitHub page, here.

Glossary

Methods

Narrative Techniques

Topics

Target

  • Nation/Entity
    United States
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Political Party, Non-State Political Actor, Minority/Majority Group
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Russia
  • Type
    Government - Proxy

#TrollTracker: Russian Traces in Facebook Takedown

United States, 2017 —Facebook assets, sharing characteristics congruent with Russia "troll-farm" and the IRA activity posted divisive political content, likely with the intention sought to polarize political debate in the United States.

#TrollTracker: Russian Traces in Facebook Takedown
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Political Party, Non-State Political Actor, Terrorism
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive, Destructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    United Arab Emirates
  • Type
    Business

UAE Facebook Pages Targeted Qatar and Muslim Brotherhood.

Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 2018 —Facebook pages created by a for-profit marketing firm in the United Arab Emirates were taken down for inauthentic behavior. The Facebook pages targeted Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood while spreading misleading content.

UAE Facebook Pages Targeted Qatar and Muslim Brotherhood.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Puerto Rico
  • Category
    Political Party, Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections
  • Tactics/Means
    Brigading, Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive, Destructive, Oblique

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Puerto Rico
  • Type
    Government

From Telegram to Twitter: Top Puerto Rican Officials Plotted Possible Information Operation.

Puerto Rico, 2018 —A group of Puerto Rican officials, among them Governor Ricardo Rosselló, used a private Telegram chat group to discuss at least 12 specific actions that either boosted pro-government messages or targeted government opponents. Shortly after each initiative was discussed, a group of troll accounts mobilized to execute the inauthentic amplification on Twitter.

From Telegram to Twitter: Top Puerto Rican Officials Plotted Possible Information Operation.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    United States
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Military, Political Party, Non-State Political Actor, Minority/Majority Group, Terrorism
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Iran
  • Type

#TrollTracker: Facebook Uncovers Iranian Influence Operation.

United States —Facebook removed 82 pages, accounts, and groups for coordinated inauthentic behavior that originated in Iran and targeted people in the United States and United Kingdom.

#TrollTracker: Facebook Uncovers Iranian Influence Operation.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    United States
  • Category
    Influential Individuals
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Non-State Political Actor, Influential Individual, Immigration, Economic Issues
  • Tactics/Means
    DDoS, Data Exfiltration
  • Approach
    Destructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Russia
  • Type
    Government

#PutinAtWar: WADA Hack Shows Kremlin Full-Spectrum Approach.

United States, 2018 —The Russian government hacked into the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), and exposed private information in an attempt to discredit both the WADA and American athletes. In a cyber-enabled influence operation, the leaked information was amplified by the Russian government and Kremlin-associated media to push a narrative emphasizing American hypocrisy and the deceits of the WADA.

#PutinAtWar: WADA Hack Shows Kremlin Full-Spectrum Approach.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Indonesia
  • Category
    Government, Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Elections, Minority/Majority Group
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive, Destructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
  • Type

#ElectionWatch: Facebook Takes Down Network Supporting Indonesian Presidential Candidate Prabowo Subianto.

Indonesia —Ahead of Indonesia's April 2019 election, several Facebook pages were removed for "coordinated inauthentic behavior." The pages shared content that targeted the incumbent President Joko Widodo and supported his political rival Prabowo Subianto.

#ElectionWatch: Facebook Takes Down Network Supporting Indonesian Presidential Candidate Prabowo Subianto.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Venezuela
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Military
  • Tactics/Means
    Brigading, Botnets
  • Approach
    Constructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Venezuela
  • Type
    Government - Proxy

Civilian Militias in Venezuela Coordinate on Twitter.

Venezuela, 2019 —Venezuelan civilian militias used institutional accounts to manipulate Twitter traffic in an effort to make pro-Maduro hashtags trend in the country. Maduro reciprocated, calling for more Venezuelans to join militias.

Civilian Militias in Venezuela Coordinate on Twitter.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Georgia
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive, Destructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Georgia
  • Type
    Government

Inauthentic Pages Linked to Majority Government Taken down in Georgia.

Georgia, 2018 —A network of inauthentic pages, disguised as news organizations, political parties, public figures, activist groups, and media entities, spread divisive socio-political content that promoted the majority government in Georgia while discrediting rivals. The network was linked to Georgian majority government party the Georgia Dream Party, as well as to an advertising agency in Georgia.

Inauthentic Pages Linked to Majority Government Taken down in Georgia.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Armenia
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Other
  • Tactics/Means
    Brigading
  • Approach
    Constructive, Destructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
  • Type

Armenia Assailed by Deceptive “Fact-Checking” Groups, Part 1: The Players.

Armenia, 2018 —Fake disinformation watchdog sites took aim at Armenian audiences spreading their messaging on Facebook and targeting the recently elected Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

Armenia Assailed by Deceptive “Fact-Checking” Groups, Part 1: The Players.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Italy
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Tactics/Means
    Brigading, Botnets, Other
  • Approach
    Constructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Italy
  • Type
    Political Party

#ElectionWatch: Italy’s Self-Made Bots.

Italy, 2014 —Civilian and corporate Twitter accounts were registered for a service hosted on Italian politician Matteo Salvini's personal website which allowed the accounts to partially be used as bots in a larger network. The dormant network was activated in the time leading up to Italy's March 2018 federal election.

#ElectionWatch: Italy’s Self-Made Bots.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    United States
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Influential Individual
  • Tactics/Means
    Brigading, Sockpuppets, Botnets
  • Approach
    Destructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Russia
  • Type
    Government

Russia’s Full Spectrum Propaganda.

United States, 2017 —A hashtag decrying Morgan Freeman (after he warned that Russia was waging an information war in the United States) was perpetuated by a group associated with Russia's Internet Research Agency. RT spread the hashtag and related media, and it was then amplified on several other platforms.

Russia’s Full Spectrum Propaganda.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Mexico
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
  • Tactics/Means
    Other
  • Approach
    Constructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
  • Type

#ElectionWatch: Likes from Afar in Oaxaca.

Mexico, 2018 —Inauthentic activity originating from South Asian Facebook accounts artificially inflated the number of Facebook “likes” on social media content for and about the state government of Oaxaca in Mexico. The main beneficiary of the activity was Alejandro Murat Hinojosa, the governor of the state of Oaxaca.

#ElectionWatch: Likes from Afar in Oaxaca.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Baltic States
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Oblique

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Russia
  • Type
    Government, Government - Proxy

Facebook’s Sputnik Takedown — In Depth.

Baltic States, 2010 —Around 300 Facebook pages masqueraded as groups with special interests — ranging from food to support for authoritarian presidents — and amplified content from the Kremlin’s media agency, Rossiya Segodnya. It appears to be a systematic and covert attempt to build Rossiya Segodnya's online audience in over a dozen countries. Sputnik, an outlet in Rossiya Segodnya's portfolio, was particularly boosted in this campaign.

Facebook’s Sputnik Takedown — In Depth.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    United States
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Military, Influential Individual, Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive, Destructive, Oblique

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Russia
  • Type
    Government - Proxy

#TrollTracker: Facebook’s Midterm Takedown.

United States —A campaign attributed to the Internet Research Agency or “troll factory” in Russia ran over 100 accounts on Instagram and Facebook. According to traces of this activity left online, the campaign posted divisive content from all political angles, right up to the eve of the U.S. midterm elections.

#TrollTracker: Facebook’s Midterm Takedown.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Brazil
  • Category
    Government, Political Party, Electorate
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets, Botnets
  • Approach
    Constructive, Oblique

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
  • Type

#ElectionWatch: FGV DAPP Uncovers Foreign Twitter Influence in Brazil.

Brazil, 2018 —In the months leading up to Brazil's 2018 federal election, 232 Twitter accounts propagated false information relating to Brazilian politics. The accounts belonged to international and external groups across Brazilian party lines.

#ElectionWatch: FGV DAPP Uncovers Foreign Twitter Influence in Brazil.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    France
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Political Party, Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Destructive, Oblique

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
  • Type

#TrollTracker: Glimpse Into a French Operation.

France, 2018 —A network of coordinated and inauthentic Facebook and Instagram accounts impersonated French-speaking users. The network's posts ranged from soccer and fashion tips for Muslim women to attacks on French President Emmanuel Macron.

#TrollTracker: Glimpse Into a French Operation.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Lithuania
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Open Web

Method

  • Topics
    Military, Non-State Political Actor
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets, Data Exfiltration
  • Approach
    Destructive, Oblique

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
  • Type
    Influential Individual

#BalticBrief: NATO Not Planning To Invade Belarus.

Lithuania, 2018 —An established Lithuanian news media outlet was hacked and a fake article depicting an alleged invasion plan of the Baltic states by NATO forces was published on the site

#BalticBrief: NATO Not Planning To Invade Belarus.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Indonesia
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Tactics/Means
    Botnets
  • Approach
    Constructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
  • Type

Social Media Spam Tactics in Indonesia.

Indonesia, 2019 —Spam accounts manipulated Twitter campaigns and hashtags in favor of the incumbent President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo. Accounts coordinated to get hashtags to trend inauthentically.

Social Media Spam Tactics in Indonesia.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    West Africa
  • Category
    Government, Political Party, Electorate, Minority/Majority Group
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections, Other
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive, Destructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Israel
  • Type
    Business

Inauthentic Israeli Facebook Assets Target the World.

West Africa, 2017 —Israeli political marketing firm the Archimedes Group targeted audiences around the world with inauthentic Facebook assets to influence elections and establish local audiences. The commercial network targeted at least 13 countries; their assets were followed by over 2.8 million users.

Inauthentic Israeli Facebook Assets Target the World.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Military, Non-State Political Actor, Terrorism
  • Tactics/Means
    Brigading
  • Approach
    Constructive, Destructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Israel
  • Type
    Government - Proxy, Business

How a “Political Astroturfing” App Coordinates Pro-Israel Influence Operations.

2019 —A pro-Israel smartphone app coordinated and amplified messages across social media platforms to promote Israel's foreign policy objectives. After a May 2019 Hamas and IDF skirmish, the app amplified pro-Israel, anti-Hamas talking points.

How a “Political Astroturfing” App Coordinates Pro-Israel Influence Operations.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Lithuania
  • Category
    Government, Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Military
  • Tactics/Means
    Other Deceptive Content Manipulation
  • Approach
    Constructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
  • Type

#BalticBrief: Disinformation Through Mistranslation.

Lithuania, 2018 —A fake translation of a video depicting Lithuania’s Minister of Defense Raimundas Karoblis was intended to cause a rift between Lithuania and Ukraine.

#BalticBrief: Disinformation Through Mistranslation.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Armenia
  • Category
    Electorate, Minority/Majority Group
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Military, Influential Individual, Other
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Russia
  • Type
    Government

Inauthentic Sputnik-Linked Pages Target the Armenian Diaspora.

Armenia —Facebook pages and groups with links to Sputnik Armenia employees distributed content that targeted Armenian diaspora populations regionally and abroad.

Inauthentic Sputnik-Linked Pages Target the Armenian Diaspora.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Middle East
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Military, Elections, Terrorism, Other
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Egypt
  • Type
    Business

Facebook Disabled Assets Linked to Egypt and UAE-Based Firms.

Middle East, 2015 —Two digital marketing companies published divisive socio-political content in the Middle East. Facebook removed many of their assets in August 2019, some of which had been active since 2015.

Facebook Disabled Assets Linked to Egypt and UAE-Based Firms.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    United States
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Military, Political Party, Non-State Political Actor, Minority/Majority Group, Other
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Iran
  • Type
    Government

#TrollTracker: Iran’s Suspected Information Operation.

United States —A network of websites and social media pages in both English and Spanish language was traced back to Iran. The advanced distribution network published pro-Iranian content and messaging that was friendly to Iranian international and regional interests.

#TrollTracker: Iran’s Suspected Information Operation.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Hong Kong
  • Category
    Influential Individuals, Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Influential Individual, Other
  • Tactics/Means
    Botnets
  • Approach
    Destructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    China
  • Type
    Government - Proxy

Twitter's Hong Kong Archives: Chinese Commercial Bots at Work.

Hong Kong, 2019 —In order to obstruct discourse about the Hong Kong protests and sow discord, a network consisting of approximately 200,000 accounts took aim at pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong via commerical spam and political tweets.

Twitter's Hong Kong Archives: Chinese Commercial Bots at Work.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Netherlands
  • Category
    Political Party
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Political Party
  • Tactics/Means
    Botnets
  • Approach
    Constructive, Oblique

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Pakistan
  • Type

#BotSpot: Bots Join Backlash Against Islamophobic Cartoon Contest.

Netherlands, 2018 —Provocations by Dutch alt-right figures who solicited cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammad were met with an inauthentic response as bot-like behavior on twitter suggests an artificially amplified backlash.

#BotSpot: Bots Join Backlash Against Islamophobic Cartoon Contest.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Turkey
  • Category
    Government
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media, Advertisment

Method

  • Topics
    Military
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive, Destructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Saudi Arabia
  • Type
    Government - Proxy

Royally Removed: Facebook Takes Down Pages Promoting Saudi Interests.

Turkey, 2017 —A Saudi-associated network of Facebook, Instagram, and web assets promoted Saudi geopolitical interests while pushing content against Turkey, Iran, and Qatar.

Royally Removed: Facebook Takes Down Pages Promoting Saudi Interests.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Spain
  • Category
    Political Party, Non-State Political Actor, Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Political Party, Non-State Political Actor, Influential Individual
  • Tactics/Means
    Brigading, Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
  • Type

Catalonia Twitter Takedown: Inorganic Campaign Pushed Pro-Independence Content.

Spain, 2018 —The Catalan independence movement was artificially amplified through the use 130+ Twitter accounts.

Catalonia Twitter Takedown: Inorganic Campaign Pushed Pro-Independence Content.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Georgia
  • Category
    Influential Individuals, Electorate, Other
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Political Party, Influential Individual, Minority/Majority Group
  • Tactics/Means
    Brigading
  • Approach
    Destructive, Oblique

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
  • Type

Gavrilov’s Night': Multiple Facebook Pages Target Protests in Georgia.

Georgia, 2019 —Georgian Facebook pages spread coordinated narratives to discredit Georgian protesters following "Gavrilov's Night."

Gavrilov’s Night': Multiple Facebook Pages Target Protests in Georgia.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Colombia
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Military, Influential Individual
  • Tactics/Means
    Botnets
  • Approach
    Constructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
  • Type

Bot-Like Accounts and Pro-Government Hashtags in Colombia.

Colombia, 2019 —A group of accounts that exhibited bot-like behavior amplified three pro-government hashtags in Colombia between May and July 2019.

Bot-Like Accounts and Pro-Government Hashtags in Colombia.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Thailand
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Military, Economic Issues
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Russia
  • Type
    Government - Proxy

Facebook Takes Down Inauthentic Pages with Connections to Thailand.

Thailand, 2010 —22 Thai Facebook and Instagram assets engaged in coordinated inauthentic behavior, pushing divisive narratives on geopolitical issues.

Facebook Takes Down Inauthentic Pages with Connections to Thailand.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Ukraine
  • Category
    Government, Electorate, Minority/Majority Group
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Minority/Majority Group
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive, Destructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Russia
  • Type
    Government - Proxy

Facebook Takes Down the 'Voice of Truth' in Ukraine.

Ukraine, 2012 —Five Facebook pages targeted Ukraine with pro-Kremlin and socially divisive content, amplifying conspiracy theories about Ukrainian events.

Facebook Takes Down the 'Voice of Truth' in Ukraine.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    United States
  • Category
    Government, Political Party, Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Political Party, Elections, Non-State Political Actor
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive, Destructive, Oblique

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Iran
  • Type
    Government - Proxy

Facebook Removes Iran-based Assets. Again.

United States, 2015 —92 Facebook assets, often engaging in political messaging, targeted the United States, United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia in coordinated inauthentic behavior attributed to Iran.

Facebook Removes Iran-based Assets. Again.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Libya
  • Category
    Other
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Military, Political Party, Terrorism
  • Tactics/Means
    Botnets
  • Approach
    Constructive, Destructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
  • Type

Libyan Hashtag Campaign Has Broader Designs: Trolling Qatar.

Libya, 2019 —A network of more than 100 Twitter accounts exhibited inauthentic coordinated behavior by encouraging public support for Libyan General Khalifa Haftar and his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) while simultaneously criticizing Qatar and promoting the interests of the United Arab Emirates.

Libyan Hashtag Campaign Has Broader Designs: Trolling Qatar.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Italy
  • Category
    Political Party, Electorate
  • Platforms
    Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Political Party, Non-State Political Actor
  • Tactics/Means
    Brigading, Botnets, Other Deceptive Content Manipulation
  • Approach
    Constructive, Destructive

Disinformant

  • Country of Origin
    Italy
  • Type
    Political Party

#ElectionWatch: Italy’s Far Right Attacks Right in Closing Moments.

Italy, 2018 —Ahead of Italy's March 4, 2018 federal election, fake documents involving candidates were disseminated less than 48 hours before the vote, during a period of media silence as stipulated by Italian election law.

#ElectionWatch: Italy’s Far Right Attacks Right in Closing Moments.
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Target

  • Nation/Entity
    Latvia
  • Category
    Electorate
  • Platforms
    Open Web, Social Media

Method

  • Topics
    Other
  • Tactics/Means
    Sockpuppets
  • Approach
    Constructive

Disinformant